

**CONGRESS/LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR**  
**Government 604, Graduate Seminar (CRN 21331)**  
**George Mason University**  
**Thursday 7:20pm – 10:00pm**  
**Music Theater Building 1002**  
**Spring 2019**  
*(updated January 21, 2019)*

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Course Website: Available for enrolled students at <http://blackboard.gmu.edu>

## **I. Course Description**

This graduate seminar on legislative behavior is designed to provide advanced graduate students an opportunity to begin to explore the literature, methodology, and theories about legislative processes. The class is organized in two sections. In the first portion of the class we will learn about the primary theories for understanding congressional institutions (lawmaking, spatial models, roll call voting, parties, committees, etc.). In the second portion of the course, we will examine the electoral connections of members of congress (elections, campaigning, campaign finance, decision making, careerism, etc.). For the most part, we will use the United States Congress as a lens through which to learn about general legislative issues. We begin with the national U.S. case because most of the advanced theory and methodology in this sub-discipline originates there. Students are encouraged to think about and apply the general U.S. case to other national legislatures, parliaments, or state-level analysis. The literature in this area is vast and we cannot hope to cover it all in one semester. We will touch on the most important topics and diverge when it seems appropriate or when students' interests demand it. This course is designed to help students prepare for advanced research in legislative process and graduate-level exams in this field.

## **II. Course Goals**

There are two primary goals for this course. First, students should gain a working familiarity with the literature on legislative process, and the U.S. Congress. Students planning to research and teach in this field should gain a fundamental grasp of substance of research in this vast field. Second, students will practice and improve their critical thinking, writing, and research skills in this class. Students will have a heavy reading load, which is necessary to begin to dissect the voluminous literature in this field. Students will also actively engage with one another in research, presentations, and writing assignments.

## **III. Course Components**

There are three graded components to this course.

*Class Presentation (10%)* Each week, one student will be responsible for presenting the required readings. The student presenter should circulate discussion questions to the rest of the class prior to the start of class (no later than Wednesdays at 5:00pm). The presenter will provide a brief oral summary of the readings and help to start discussion about the day's topics. The presenter should note points of interest, confusion, or controversy in the readings and provide a thoughtful criticism.

*Weekly Reaction Papers (40%)* Each week each student must write a memo that provides a reaction to the week's readings. There are 14 class meetings, and each student must write 10 reaction memos (meaning you get 4 optional bye-weeks, to be selected at your choosing).

MASTER'S STUDENTS: This memo must not be more than 250 words or longer than 1 page. Your goal is to summarize key research findings in a concise and expert format.

PHD STUDENTS: This memo should contain 3-5 sentences on each assigned reading, as well as a paragraph that summarizes the state of the field on the topic.

*Research paper (50%)* Each student is responsible for writing one journal or conference quality research paper. Use the literature to guide a creative thought process and to help you develop a reasonable research question. These papers will be completed in three stages. First, you will complete a 1-page introduction that states a thesis, or research question, and provides a basic outline of your paper (**due February 28**). Second, you will write a literature review and research design (**due April 11**). Third, you will hand in your completed project during our assigned final examination period on **Thursday, May 9 at 7:30pm**. Late assignments will result in a reduced score.

#### IV. Logistics

A. *Class Attendance and Participation.* Learning is an *active*, rather than *passive*, exercise. Accordingly, every student is expected to attend class as well as be prepared to ask questions about and comment on the readings. You need to complete the daily reading assignment *prior* to the class meeting. You will be much more successful in this class if you attend regularly, take notes, pay attention, and participate.

B. *Readings.* As is the case with attendance, keeping pace with the reading is essential to succeeding in this class. It is *your* responsibility to obtain copies of the readings prior to the date we will discuss them in class. I will do everything I can to make this task easier for you. You will be much more successful in this course if you complete the assigned readings and **take notes** on them.

C. *Technology* Laptops, tablets, and smart phone are a considerable distraction in class. A student can become easily distracted by non-class alternatives that compete for your attention.

In addition, [research](#) shows that students tend to retain more information by taking notes by hand rather than on a computer. However, this course is technology heavy as we will be learning statistical software that is probably unfamiliar to you. It requires considerable practice and training. Therefore, I leave it to students to make their own choice about how to maximize their in-class learning. If you choose to use a laptop, make a commitment to only using content related to class.

*D. Cheating, Plagiarism, and Academic Integrity.* Students in this course will be expected to comply with the George Mason University Honor Code (see <http://honorcode.gmu.edu/>). There are three simple guidelines to follow with respect to academic integrity: (1) all work you submit must be your own; (2) when using the work or ideas of others, including fellow students, give full credit through accurate citations; and (3) if you are uncertain about the expectations for any assignment, ask for clarification. Any student engaged in any academic misconduct *will receive an F on the offending exam or assignment*. Egregious violations will result in an F grade for the course and will be reported to the appropriate Dean's office. These violations include cheating on an exam, using someone else's work as your own, and plagiarizing the written word. Plagiarism (using someone else's words or ideas without providing credit or citation) is a serious offense. *If you have any questions at all about what constitutes cheating, plagiarism, or academic misconduct, please ask the instructor.*

*E. Students with Disabilities.* If you have a disability for which you are or may be requesting an accommodation, please let me (the instructor) know and contact the Office of Disability Services (ODS) at (703) 993-2474 or <http://ods.gmu.edu>. All discussions with me regarding disabilities are confidential.

*F. Email.* Mason uses only Mason e-mail accounts to communicate with enrolled students. Students must activate their Mason e-mail account, use it to communicate with their department and other administrative units, and check it regularly for important university information including messages related to this class. *Email etiquette:* An email is a professional correspondence; do not write it as if it is a text message, snap, tweet, or IM. Always use a salutation and sign your name. Consider creating a signature that automatically inserts your name and basic contact information at the bottom of your emails. Use proper punctuation and grammar.

*G. Dropping or withdrawing.* The last day to add this course is Tuesday, January 29, 2019. The last day to drop the class with no tuition penalty is February 5, 2019. Students may elect to withdrawal from the class (with 100% tuition liability) between February 6 – February 12. From February 26 – March 25 students may elect to use a Mason “selective withdrawal” to drop the course (you can only do this three times during your time as a Mason student). After March 25 there are no options for withdrawing from the course. More information on drop and withdrawal policies is [here](#). If you have concerns about your performance in the course, or you find yourself unable to perform for any reason, you should discuss your concerns with your teaching assistant, professor, advisor, and Assistant Dean (in that order). Students seeking to drop or withdrawal are responsible for doing so on their own in Patriot Web. If you need help

or advice, please see your academic advisor. The advisors in the Schar School main office (3<sup>rd</sup> floor Research Hall) can also help.

*Grading.* In this course, I will use a grading scale that is typical of Ph.D.-level courses that includes a four-part scale. You can think of the scale as being: high-pass, pass, low-pass, or fail. The grade scale and its interpretation is the following:

Grade	Interpretation
A	Excellent work; high pass.
A-	Good work; pass.
B+	Work needs some improvement; low-pass. If you plan to take Ph.D.-level exams in American politics, you need to do some additional review of the material presented in this course.
B or lower	Your work has not demonstrated mastery of the material that would be appropriate for a career in academia as a professor. Alternative career paths may be a better option for you.

## V. Required Texts

The reading load for this course is intense and dense. It is vital that you keep up with the readings. One of the most important skills you will learn as a graduate student (most important in terms of being successful in graduate school) is how to efficiently digest a large volume of readings. I know that you will not be able to read every word that is assigned; but you will need to learn how to quickly glean the most important points from each reading. While I cannot require it, I *strongly* encourage you to take notes on everything you read. Good organization and careful note taking will increase your retention of the material, improve your ability to recall information, lead to superior classroom discussions, and reduce your research and study time at later points. Taking notes may mean it takes longer to get through some material, but the (long term) benefits of doing so, far exceed the (short term) costs.

For each article or book you read, as a minor guide to digesting volumes of information in an efficient way, use the following questions to help focus your attention about each piece of research:

- 1.) What is the main question the author is asking?
- 2.) What motivates the question, or why is the author asking the question?
- 3.) What is the primary expectation, hypothesis, or claim the author seeks to test?
- 4.) On what theory or logic is the expectation based?
- 5.) What methods of investigation has the author used to evaluate the claim?
- 6.) What are the primary findings? Were the expectations met?
- 7.) How does this research advance, or contribute to, our knowledge of this topic?

In addition to the following required texts, a series of articles are listed in the detailed weekly description below. I strongly recommend that students use bibliographic software to access, document, and catalog the items they read. While there are many such software options

around, I recommend using Zotero, a free add-in for your web-browser. Information and tutorials on Zotero are available [here](https://infoguides.gmu.edu/politics/cite) (<https://infoguides.gmu.edu/politics/cite>). **As a first assignment, I ask that students explore this software and download all the readings into Zotero.** All the articles are available through web access at Mason's library, and most of the books are available in the library. This [guide](#) has resources about finding articles. You can also search for the title or journal from the library homepage, or use [Political Science Complete](#) or [Google Scholar](#) to find the articles listed below (you'll need to use your GMU login and the Duo Mobile two factor authentication to access these). We will go over these strategies in class. Using bibliographic software will make your life easier—never fret about formatting a bibliography ever again! For graduate students who expect to take field exams, this approach is essential.

Required:

- Adler, E. Scott, and John D. Wilkerson. 2012. *Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving*. Cambridge [England]; Cambridge University Press.
- Binder, Sarah A. 2003. *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Harbridge, Laurel. 2015. *Is Bipartisanship Dead?: Policy Agreement and Agenda-Setting in the House of Representatives*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Koger, Gregory, and Matthew J. Lebo. 2017. *Strategic Party Government: Why Winning Trumps Ideology*. 1 edition. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press.
- La Raja, Raymond J., and Brian F. Schaffner. 2015. *Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lee, Frances E. 2016. *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign*. Chicago; The University of Chicago Press.
- Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Second edition. Yale Studies in Political Science; 26. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rubin, Ruth Bloch. 2017. *Building the Bloc: Intraparty Organization in the US Congress*. Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 2017. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*. Fifth edition. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage CQ Press.
- Theriault, Sean M. 2008. *Party Polarization in Congress*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Recommended:

- Brady, David W., and Craig Volden. 2006. *Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush*. 2nd ed. Transforming American Politics. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press. (Ch. 1)

- Cox, Gary W. 2005. *Setting the Agenda Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Chs 1-3, 5)
- Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. 2015. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. Ninth edition. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Sulkin, Tracy. 2005. *Issue Politics in Congress*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Swers, Michele L. 2013. *Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the Senate*. Chicago; University of Chicago Press.
- Victor, Jennifer Nicoll, and Nils Ringe. 2013. *Bridging the Information Gap: Legislative Member Organizations as Social Networks in the United States and the European Union*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Volden, Craig, and Alan E. Wiseman. 2014. *Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress: The Lawmakers*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

\*Using the [Gender Balance Assessment Tool](#) (GBAT) developed by Jane Lawrence Sumner, the required BOOKS for this class are comprised of 13 authors who are 39% women. On the complete syllabus of required readings there are 181 authors who are 20% women, 5.5% Asian, 11% Black, 4% Hispanic, and 77% White authors.

## VI. Course Schedule and Reading Assignments

### Thursday, January 24

#### INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF CONGRESS

#### *Required Readings:*

- Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 2017. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*. Fifth edition. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage CQ Press. (Chs. 1-4)
- Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall. 1988. "[The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.](#)" *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 132-163.

## PART I: CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS

### Thursday, January 31

#### LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

#### *Required Readings:*

- Binder, Sarah A. 2003. *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- Madonna, Anthony J. 2011. "[Winning Coalition Formation in the U.S. Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2): 276-288.

- Sinclair, Barbara. 2017. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*. Fifth edition. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage CQ Press. (Chs. 5-10)**
- Wilkerson, John, David Smith, and Nicholas Stramp. 2015. "Tracing the Flow of Policy Ideas in Legislatures: A Text Reuse Approach." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (4): 943–56. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12175>.
- Woon, Jonathan. 2009. "[Issue Attention and Legislative Proposals in the U.S. Senate.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 34(1): 29-54.

*Recommended Readings:*

- Binder, Sarah A. 1999. "[The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-1996.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 93:3.
- Binder, Sarah A. 1996. "[The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 90:1 (pp. 8-20).
- Binder, Sarah A. and Steven S. Smith. 1997. *Politics or Principle: Filibustering in the United States Senate*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Kessler, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel. 1996. "[Dynamics of Cosponsorship.](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 90:3 (pp. 555-566).
- Mayhew, David R. 1991. *Divided we Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990*.
- Oleszek, Walter. 2013. *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Patty, John W. 2007. "[The House Discharge Procedure and Majoritarian Politics](#)" *Journal of Politics*, 69(3): 678.
- Redman, Eric. 1973. *The Dance of Legislation*. New York: Simon & Schuster Inc.
- Schickler, Eric and Gregory Wawro. 2004. "[Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate,](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4): 758.
- Schiller, Wendy J. 1995. "[Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 39:1 (pp. 186-203).

**Thursday, February 7**

MODELING LEGISLATORS

*Required Readings:*

- Brady, David W. and Craig Volden. 2006. *Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. **Chs. 1-2.**
- Dziuda, Wioletta, and Antoine Loeper. 2018. "Dynamic Pivotal Politics." *The American Political Science Review; Washington* 112 (3): 580–601.  
<http://dx.doi.org/mutex.gmu.edu/10.1017/S0003055418000187>.
- Hitt, Matthew P., Craig Volden, and Alan E. Wiseman. 2017. "Spatial Models of Legislative Effectiveness." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (3): 575–90.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12296>.
- Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Second edition. Yale Studies in Political Science ; 26. New Haven: Yale University Press.**
- Riker, William. 1980. "[Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 74(2): 432-446.

Woon, Jonathan. 2009. "Change We Can Believe In? Using Political Science to Predict Policy Change in the Obama Presidency." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, April 2009. Available: [http://www.pitt.edu/~woon/papers/ps\\_change.pdf](http://www.pitt.edu/~woon/papers/ps_change.pdf)

### *Recommended Readings*

(See Symposium on Pivotal Politics in *JOP* 80(3), July 2018)

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New Haven: Yale UP.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper Collins.

Enelow, James M. & Melvin J. Hinich. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: an introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger. 1997. *Analytical Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP: **Ch. 1** (pp. 3-20).

Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger. 1997. *Analytical Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP: Ch. 2 (pp. 21-49).

Krehbiel, Keith. 1988. "[Spatial Models of Legislative Choice](#)." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, XIII:3.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1-2.

Riker, William. 1982. *Liberalism Against Populism*. San Francisco: Freeman Press.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. "[Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models](#)." *American Journal of Political Science*, 23:1 (pp. 27-59).

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast, eds. 1995. *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: pp. 5-35.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton: **pp. 5-35; 312-344**

Stewart, Charles. 2012. *Analyzing Congress*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York: W.W. Norton: **Ch. 1**.

### **Thursday, February 14**

#### ROLL CALL VOTING

#### *Required Readings*

Bonica, Adam. 2018. "Inferring Roll-Call Scores from Campaign Contributions Using Supervised Machine Learning." *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (4): 830–48.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12376>.

Grose, Christian R., Neil Malhotra, and Robert Parks Van Houweling. 2015. "Explaining Explanations: How Legislators Explain Their Policy Positions and How Citizens React." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (3): 724–43.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12164>.

**Koger, Gregory, and Matthew J. Lebo. 2017. *Strategic Party Government: Why Winning Trumps Ideology*. 1 edition. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press.**

Londregan, John. 1999. "Estimating Legislators' Preferred Points." *Political Analysis* 8:35-56.

Poole, Keith T. 1999. "[NOMINATE: A Short Intellectual History](#)." *The Political Methodologist* 9:1-6.

Poole, Keith. Website: <http://voteview.com>



*Recommended Readings:*

- Clinton, Joshua D. 2006. "[Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106<sup>th</sup> House.](#)" *Journal of Politics* 68(2): 397-409.
- Clinton, Joshua D. 2007. "[Lawmaking and Roll Calls.](#)" *Journal of Politics* 69(2): 457-469.
- Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman and Douglas Rivers. 2004. "[The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data.](#)" *American Political Science Review* 98 (2): 355-370.
- Groseclose, Timothy and James Snyder. 2003. "[Interpreting the Coefficient of Party Influence.](#)" *Political Analysis*, 11: 104-7.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 2003. "[Asymmetry in party Influence: Reply.](#)" *Political Analysis* 11: 108-9.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 2003. "[The Coefficient of Party Influence.](#)" *Political Analysis* 11: 95-103.
- Poole, Keith T. 1998. "[Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science* 42:954-993.
- Poole, Keith T. 2005. *Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting*. NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. "[A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 29:1 (pp. 357-384).
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "[Patterns of Congressional Voting.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 35:1 (pp. 228-278).
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. *Ideology & Congress*. Transaction Publishers.
- Poole, Keith T. Howard Rosenthal, and Kenneth Koford. 1991. "[On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 85:3 (pp. 955-976).
- Snyder, James M. and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. "[Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44 (pp. 193-211).
- Snyder, James M. Jr., 1992. "[Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 17(3): 319-345.
- Weisberg, Herbert F. 1978. "[Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll-Call Voting.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 22:3 (554-577).

**Thursday, February 21**

STRATEGIES IN LEGISLATIVE VOTING

*Required Readings:*

- Adler, E. Scott, and John D. Wilkerson. 2012. *Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving*. Cambridge [England], Cambridge University Press.**
- Calvert, Randall L. and Richard F. Fenno, Jr. 1994. "[Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate.](#)" *The Journal of Politics*, 56:2 (349-376).
- Denzau, Arthur, William Riker, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1985. "[Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 79:4 (pp. 1117-1134).
- Donnelly, Christopher P. 2019. "Yea or Nay: Do Legislators Benefit by Voting Against Their Party?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 0 (0). Accessed January 20, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsg.12233>.
- Ferejohn, John. 1986. "[Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation.](#)" in *Congress and Policy Change*, Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd, eds. New York: Agathon Press, Inc.

Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Nathan W. Monroe. 2016. "On Measuring Legislative Agenda-Setting Power." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (1): 158–74.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12191>.

Kingdon, John W. 1977. "[Models of Legislative Voting](#)." *Journal of Politics*, 39.

### *Recommended Readings*

Bernhard, William, Daniel Sewell, and Tracy Sulkin. 2017. "A Clustering Approach to Legislative Styles." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42 (3): 477–506.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12162>.

Gelman, Jeremy. 2017. "Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42 (4): 661–92.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12173>.

Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Michael C. Munger. 2003. "[Investigating the Incidence of Killer Amendments in Congress](#)." *Journal of Politics*, 65(2): 498-517.

Kingdon, John W. 1973. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. New York: Harper & Row.

Krehbiel, Keith and Douglas Rivers. 1990. "[Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration](#)." *The Journal of Politics*, 52:2 (pp. 548-578).

Matthews, Donald R., and James A. Stimson. 1975. *Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: Wiley.

Ordeshook, Peter C. and Thomas Palfrey. 1988. "[Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information](#)." *American Journal of Political Science*, 32:2 (pp. 441-466).

Stiglitz, Edward H. and Barry R. Weingast. 2010. "[Agenda Control in Congress: Evidence from Cutpoint Estimates and Ideal Point Uncertainty](#)." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 35(2): 157-185.

Wilkerson, John D. 1999. "[Killer' Amendments in Congress](#)." *American Political Science Review*, 93(3).

## **Thursday, February 28**

## **Research Paper Introduction DUE Today**

### CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

#### *Required Readings*

Adler, E. Scott and John S. Lapinski. 1997. "[Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition](#)." *American Journal of Political Science*, 41.

Berry, Christopher R., and Anthony Fowler. 2016. "Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (3): 692–708. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12192>.

Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. "[Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature](#)." *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(2): 531-564.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. "[Are Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 84:1.

Park, Ju Yeon. 2017. "A Lab Experiment on Committee Hearings: Preferences, Power, and a Quest for Information." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42 (1): 3–31.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12139>.

Pearson, Kathryn, and Eric Schickler. 2009. "[Discharge Petitions, Agenda Control, and the Congressional Committee System, 1929-76](#)". *The Journal of Politics*, 71(4): 1238-1256.

- Richman, Jesse. 2008. "[Uncertainty and the Prevalence of Committee Outliers.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 33(2): 323-47.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "[The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 81:1 (pp. 85-104).

*Recommended Readings:*

- Fenno, Richard. *Congressmen and Committees*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Fiorina, Morris and Charles R. Plott. 1978. "[Committee Decisions Under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 72.
- Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. "[Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 33:2 (pp. 459-490).
- Groseclose, Tim and Charles Stewart III. 1998. "[The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-91.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(2): 453-474.
- Hall, Richard L. 1987. "[Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 81:1 (pp. 105-128).
- Jones, Bryan D., Frank R. Baumgartner and Jeffery C. Talbert. 1993. "[The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress.](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 87:3.
- Hall, Richard L. and Bernard Grofman. 1990. "[The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 84:4.
- King, David C. 1997. *Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith and Douglas Rivers. 1988. "[The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 32:4 (pp. 1151-1174).
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- McKelvey, Richard D. and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1984. "[An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior.](#)" *Journal of Politics*. Vol. 46.
- Miller, Gary J. and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 1982. "[Universalism in Experimental Committees.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 76:3 (pp. 561-574).
- Smith, Steven S. and Christopher Deering. 1984. *Committees in Congress*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Stewart, Charles. 2012. *Analyzing Congress*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.. New York: W.W. Norton: **Ch. 8.**
- Sulkin, Tracy. 2005. *Issue Politics in Congress*. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, Chs. 1-3, 6**

**Thursday, March 7**

SOCIAL NETWORKS IN CONGRESS

- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Dino P. Christenson, and Alison W. Craig. 2019. "Cue-Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters." *American Journal of Political Science* 63 (1): 163–80. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12399>.
- Bratton, Kathleen A. and Stella M. Rouse. 2011. "[Networks in the Legislative Arena: How Group Dynamics Affect Cosponsorship.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36(3): 423-460.

- Carpenter, Daniel P., Kevin M. Esterling and David M. Lazer. 2004. "[Friends, Brokers, and Transitivity: Who Informs Whom in Washington Politics?](#)" *Journal of Politics*, 66: 224-246.
- Fowler, James H. 2006. "[Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks.](#)" *Political Analysis*, 14: 456-87.
- Koger, Gregory, Seth E. Masket, and Hans Noel. 2009. "[Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party Networks.](#)" *British Journal of Political Science*, 39: 633-653.
- Masket, Seth E. 2008. "[Where You Sit is Where You Stand: The Impact of Seating Proximity of Legislative Cue-Taking.](#)" *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 3: 301-311.
- Montgomery, Jacob M., and Brendan Nyhan. 2017. "The Effects of Congressional Staff Networks in the US House of Representatives." *The Journal of Politics* 79 (3): 745–61. <https://doi.org/10.1086/690301>.
- Nyhan, Brendan, and Jacob M. Montgomery. 2015. "Connecting the Candidates: Consultant Networks and the Diffusion of Campaign Strategy in American Congressional Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (2): 292–308. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12143>.
- Ringe, Nils, Jennifer Nicoll Victor and Justin H. Gross. 2013. "[Keeping Your Friends Close and Your Enemies Closer? Information Networks in Legislative Politics.](#)" *British Journal of Political Science*, 43(3): 601-628.
- Ringe, Nils, Jennifer Nicoll Victor, and Wendy Tam Cho. 2017. "Legislative Networks," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Networks*, Victor, Montgomery, & Lubell, eds. [AVAILABLE AT LIBRARY.GMU.EDU](#) (login using gmu credentials)
- Victor, Jennifer Nicoll and Nils Ringe. 2009. "[The Social Utility of Informal Institutions: Caucuses as Networks in the 110th U.S. House of Representatives,](#)" *American Politics Research*, 37(5): 742-766.

*Recommended Readings:*

- Bendix, William, and Jon Mackay. 2017. "Partisan Infighting Among House Republicans: Leaders, Factions, and Networks of Interests." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42 (4): 549–77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12168>.
- Koger, Gregory. 2003. "[Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28(2): 225–246.
- Porter, Mason A., Mucha, Peter J., Newman, M.E.J., Warmbrand, Casey M. 2005. "A Network Analysis of Committees in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 102:7057-7062.
- Ringe, Nils and Jennifer Nicoll Victor. 2013. *Bridging the Information Gap: Legislative Member Organizations as Social Networks in the United States and the European Union*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Wojcik, Stefan, and Shawna Mullenax. 2017. "Men Idle, Women Network: How Networks Help Female Legislators Succeed." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42 (4): 579–610. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12169>.

**Thursday, March 21**

PARTIES IN CONGRESS: PART I

*Required Readings:*

- Gailmard, Sean, and Jeffery A. Jenkins. 2007. "[Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House: fingerprints of Majority Party Power.](#)" *Journal of Politics* 69(3): 689-699.
- Lee, Frances E. 2016. *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign*. Chicago ; The University of Chicago Press.**
- Lee, Frances E. 2018. "The 115th Congress and Questions of Party Unity in a Polarized Era." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (4): 1464–73. <https://doi.org/10.1086/699335>.
- Snyder, James M., Jr. and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. "[Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll Call Voting.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 44: 193-211.

*Recommended Readings:*

- Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2001. "[The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll Call Voting.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 26:533-72.
- Binder, Sarah, Eric D. Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. "[Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party.](#)" *Journal of Politics*, 61: 815-831.
- Covington, Cary R. and Andrew A. Bargen. 2004. "[Comparing Floor-Dominated and Party-Dominated Explanations of Policy Change in the House of Representatives.](#)" *Journal of Politics* 66(4): 1069-1088.
- Cox, Gary and Keith T. Poole. 2002. "[On Measuring Partisanship in Roll Call Voting: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3): 477-489.
- Cox, Gary and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1997. "[Toward a theory of Legislative Rules Change: Assessing Schickler and Rich's Evidence.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 41: 1376-1386.
- Dodd, Lawrence C. and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 2013. *Congress Reconsidered*, 10<sup>th</sup> ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. **Chs. 7, 8**
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "[Where's the Party?](#)" *British Journal of Political Science*, 23, 235-266.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1995. "[Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z,](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 41: 958-964.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. "[Party Discipline and Measure of Partisanship,](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*," 44.
- Lawrence Eric D., Forrest Maltzman and Steven S. Smith. 2006. "[Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(1): 33.
- McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. "[The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress.](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 95.
- Schickler, Eric and Andrew Rich. 1997. "[Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 41: 1340-1375.
- Stewart, Charles. 2012. *Analyzing Congress*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York: W.W. Norton: **Ch. 7**.

PARTIES IN CONGRESS: PART II

**Thursday, March 28**

*Required Readings:*

- Clark, Jennifer Hayes. 2012. "[Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels: Evidence from the U.S. States.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 37(4): 491-507.
- Dynes, Adam M., and Andrew Reeves. 2018. "Who Benefits from the Party Organization? Evidence from Republican House Members' Attendance at Caucus Meetings." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 43 (2): 207–43. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsg.12193>.
- Finocchiaro, Charles J. and David W. Rohde. 2008. "[War for the Floor: Partisan Theory and Agenda Control in the U.S. House of Representatives.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 33(1): 35-61.
- Jenkins, Jeffrey A., Michael H. Crespin, and Jamie L. Carson. 2005. "[Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress: An Examination of Differing Career Tracks.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30(3): 365.
- Rubin, Ruth Bloch. 2017. *Building the Bloc: Intraparty Organization in the US Congress*. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.**
- Smith, Steven S., Ian Ostrander, and Christopher M. Pope. 2013. "[Majority Party Power and Procedural Motions in the U.S. Senate.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 38(2): 205-236.

*Recommended Readings:*

- Aldrich, John. 2011. *Why Parties? A Second Look*. University of Chicago Press.
- Bianco, William T. and Itai Sened. 2005. "[Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government: Reassessing Majority Party Influence in Congress and State Legislatures.](#)" *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 361.
- Brady, David W. 1985. "[A Reevaluation of Realignment in American Politics: Evidence From the House of Representatives,](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 79.
- Cooper, Joseph and David Brady. 1981. "[Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn,](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 75.
- Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. University of California Press.
- Evans, C. Lawrence. 1991. *Leadership in Committee: A Comparative Analysis of Leadership Behavior in the United States Senate*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Jones, Charles O. 1968. "[Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives.](#)" *Journal of Politics*, 30.
- Nelson, Garrison. 1977. "[Partisan Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789-1977,](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 71.
- Rhode, David. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. University of Chicago Press.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 1999. "[Transformational Leader or Faithful Agent?](#) Principal-Agent Theory and House Majority Party Leadership," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 24.
- Smith, Steven S. 2000. "[Positive Theories of Congressional Parties,](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25.
- Smith, Steven. 2007. *Party Influence in Congress*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

**PART II: ELECTIONS AND CANDIDATES**

**Thursday, April 4**

CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

*Required Readings:*

- Abramowitz, Alan I., Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. 2006. "[Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections.](#)" *Journal of Politics* 68(1) 75-88.
- Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, Jason M. Roberts. 2007. "[Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress.](#)" *American Political Science Review* 101(2): 289.
- Desmarais, Bruce A., Raymond J. La Raja, and Michael S. Kowal. 2015. "The Fates of Challengers in U.S. House Elections: The Role of Extended Party Networks in Supporting Candidates and Shaping Electoral Outcomes." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (1): 194–211. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12106>.
- Edwards, Barry, Michael Crespín, Ryan D. Williamson, and Maxwell Palmer. 2017. "Institutional Control of Redistricting and the Geography of Representation." *The Journal of Politics* 79 (2): 722–26. <https://doi.org/10.1086/690633>.
- Erikson, Robert S. 2016. "Congressional Elections in Presidential Years: Presidential Coattails and Strategic Voting." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41 (3): 551–74. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsg.12127>.
- Friedman, John N., and Richard T. Holden. 2009. "[The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: What's Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?](#)" *The Journal of Politics*, 71(2): 593-611.
- Hall, Andrew B., and Daniel M. Thompson. 2018. "Who Punishes Extremist Nominees? Candidate Ideology and Turning Out the Base in US Elections." *The American Political Science Review; Washington* 112 (3): 509–24. <http://dx.doi.org.mutex.gmu.edu/10.1017/S0003055418000023>.
- Henderson, John A., Brian T. Hamel, and Aaron M. Goldzimer. 2018. "Gerrymandering Incumbency: Does Nonpartisan Redistricting Increase Electoral Competition?" *The Journal of Politics* 80 (3): 1011–16. <https://doi.org/10.1086/697120>.
- Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. 2015. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. Ninth edition. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.**
- Kanthak, Kristin, and Jonathan Woon. 2015. "Women Don't Run? Election Aversion and Candidate Entry." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (3): 595–612. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12158>.

*Recommended Readings:*

- Ansola-behere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr. and Charles Stewart III. 2001. "[Candidate positioning in U.S. House elections,](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 45: 136-59.
- Cox, Gary and Jonathan Katz. 1996. "[Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 40.
- Erikson, Robert and Thomas Palfrey. 1998. "[Campaign Spending and Incumbency.](#)" *Journal of Politics*, vol. 60.
- Erikson, Robert and Thomas Palfrey. 2000. "[Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 94.

- Erikson, Robert. 1972. "[Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and party Fortunes in Congressional Elections.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 66.
- Ferejohn, John A. 1977. "[On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 71:1 (pp. 166-176).
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale UP.
- Fiorina, Morris. 1989. *Congress: Keystone to the Washington Establishment*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New Have: Yale University Press.
- Gerber, Alan. 1998. "[Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 92:2.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1978. "[The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 72:2.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1987. "[The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1952-1982.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 31:1.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1989. "[Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986.](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 83:3.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. "[The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 34:2.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. "[Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals.](#)" *Polity*, vol. 6.
- Stewart, Charles. 2012. *Analyzing Congress*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York: W.W. Norton: **Ch. 4.**

**Thursday, April 11**

**Research paper literature review and research design DUE today**

ELECTORAL RAMIFICATIONS

*Required Readings*

- Ansolabehere, Stephen and Philip Edwards Jones. 2010. "[Constituents' Responses to Congressional Roll-Call Voting.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(3): 583-597.
- Kalla, Joshua L., and David E. Broockman. 2016. "Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (3): 545–58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12180>.
- La Raja, Raymond J., and Brian F. Schaffner. 2015. *Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.**
- Lewis, Daniel C. 2012. "[Legislative Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Performance.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 37(2): 305-328.
- Martin, Paul S. and Michele P. Claibourn. 2013. "[Citizen Participation and Congressional Responsiveness: New Evidence that Participation Matters.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 38(1): 59-81.

*Recommended Readings:*

- Adler, E. Scott. 2002. *Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System*. University of Chicago Press.
- Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven: Yale U.P.
- Clausen, Aage. 1973. *How Congressmen Decide*. New York: St. Martin's Press.



- Cormack, Lindsey. 2016. "Extremity in Congress: Communications versus Votes." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41 (3): 575–603. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsg.12126>.
- Katz, Jonathan N. and Brian R. Sala. 1996. "[Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection](#)." *American Political Science Review*, 90:1.
- Kingdon, John W. 1989. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. "[Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making](#)." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, XIX:3.

## Thursday, April 18

### POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS

#### *Required Readings:*

- Harbridge, Laurel. 2015. *Is Bipartisanship Dead?: Policy Agreement and Agenda-Setting in the House of Representatives*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.**
- Lawless, Jennifer L., Sean M. Theriault, and Samantha Guthrie. 2018. "Nice Girls? Sex, Collegiality, and Bipartisan Cooperation in the US Congress." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (4): 1268–82. <https://doi.org/10.1086/698884>.
- Miller, Gary and Norman Schofield. 2003. "[Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States](#)." *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 245.
- Theriault, Sean M. 2008. *Party Polarization in Congress*. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.**

#### *Recommended Readings:*

- Bateman, David A., Joshua D. Clinton, and John S. Lapinski. 2017. "A House Divided? Roll Calls, Polarization, and Policy Differences in the U.S. House, 1877–2011." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (3): 698–714. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12281>.
- Carson, Jamie L., Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo, and Everett Young. 2010. "[The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress](#)." *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(3): 598-616.
- Lebo, Matthew J., Adam J. McGlynn, and Gregory Koger. 2007. "[Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789-2000](#)." *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(3): 464-481.
- Lee, Frances. 2009. *Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U. S. Senate*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. **Ch. 1**
- Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton UP.
- Gelman, Andrew. 2010. *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why American Vote the Way They Do*. Princeton UP.
- Jones, David R. 2010. "[Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections](#)." *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2): 323-337.

- Lazarus, Jeffrey. 2010. "[Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2): 338-353.
- McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
- Patty, John W. 2008. "[Equilibrium Party Government.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(3): 636-655.
- Sanders, Bailey. 2018. "Partisan Bridges to Bipartisanship: The Case of Contraceptive Coverage." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 43 (3): 521–46. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12205>.

### **PART III: REPRESENTATION AND CONSTITUENTS**

#### **Thursday, April 25**

##### REPRESENTATION ISSUES: RACE, GENDER, AND...

##### *Required Readings:*

- Anzia, Sarah F. and Christopher R. Berry. 2011. "[The Jackie \(and Jill\) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3): 478-493.
- Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura, and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "[The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout.](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 98(1): 65-75.
- Carson, Jamie L. Michael H. Crespin, Carrie P. Eaves, and Emily Wanless. 2011. "[Constituency Congruency and Candidate Competition in U.S. House Elections.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36(3): 461-482.
- Fraga, Bernard L. 2016. "Candidates or Districts? Reevaluating the Role of Race in Voter Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (1): 97–122. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12172>.
- Griffin, John D. and Brian Newman. 2013. "[Voting Power, Policy Representation, and Disparities in Voting's Rewards.](#)" *The Journal of Politics*, 75(1): 52-64.
- Griffin, John D., Brian Newman, and Christina Wolbrecht. 2012. "[A Gender Gap in Policy Representation in the U.S. Congress?](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 37(1): 35-66.
- Hayes, Danny and Seth C. McKee. 2012. "[The Intersection of Redistricting, Race, and Participation.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1): 115-130.
- Hutchings, Vincent L. Harwood K. McClerking and Guy-Uriel Charles. 2004. "[Congressional Representation of Black Interests: Recognizing the Importance of Stability.](#)" *Journal of Politics* 66(2): 450-468.
- O'Brien, Diana Z. and Johanna Rickne. 2016. "Gender Quotas and Women's Political Leadership." *The American Political Science Review; Washington* 110 (1): 112–26. <http://dx.doi.org/mutex.gmu.edu/10.1017/S0003055415000611>.
- Schuit, Sophie, and Jon C. Rogowski. 2017. "Race, Representation, and the Voting Rights Act." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (3): 513–26. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12284>.
- Swers, Michele L. 2013. *Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the Senate*. Chicago; University of Chicago Press. Chs. 1-3, 6.**

*Recommended Readings:*

- Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "[Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substance Black Representation in Congress?](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 90: 794-812.
- Cannon, David. 1999. *Race and Representation in Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carnes, Nicholas. 2012. "[Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress Matter?](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 37(1): 5-34.
- Carson, Jamie L. 2005. "[Strategy, Selection and Candidate Competition in U.S. House and Senate Elections.](#)" *Journal of Politics* 67(1): 1-28.
- Cox, Gary and Jonathan Katz. 2002. *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander*. Cambridge UP.
- Durr, Robert H, John B Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht. 1997. "[Explaining Congressional Approval.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 41:1 (pp. 175-207).
- Erikson, Robert S. 1978. "[Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Representation Data.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 22:3 (pp. 511-535).
- Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. Mackuen, and James A. Stimson. 1998. "[What Moves Macropartisanship? A Response to Green, Palmquist, and Schickler.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 92:4.
- Fenno, Richard. 1978. *Homestyle*. New York: Little Brown.
- Finocchiaro, Charles J., and Scott A. MacKenzie. 2018. "Making Washington Work: Legislative Entrepreneurship and the Personal Vote from the Gilded Age to the Great Depression." *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (1): 113–31.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12326>.
- Fowler, James. 2005. "[Dynamic Responsiveness in the U.S. Senate.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 29-312.
- Griffin, John D. and Brian Newman. 2005. "[Are Voters Better Represented?](#)" *Journal of Politics* 67(4): 1206-1227.
- Hibbing, John R. and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. *Congress as Public Enemy: Public Attitudes Toward American Political Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Hill, Kim Quaile and Patricia A. Hurley. 1999. "[Dyadic Representation Reappraised.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 45 (pp. 109-137).
- Kanthak, Kristin and George A. Krause. 2010. "[Valuing Diversity in Political Organizations: Gender and Token Minorities in the U.S. House of Representatives.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(4): 839-854.
- Ladam, Christina, Jeffrey J. Harden, and Jason H. Windett. 2018. "Prominent Role Models: High-Profile Female Politicians and the Emergence of Women as Candidates for Public Office." *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (2): 369–81.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12351>.
- Leighley Jan. E. and Jonathan Nagler. 2014. *Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality and Turnout in the United States*. Princeton UP.
- Lublin, David. 1999. "[Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substance Black Representation in Congress?'](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 93:1.

- Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "[Constituency Influence in Congress.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 57.
- Shotts, Kenneth W. 2003. "[Does Racial Redistricting Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes? Policy Preferences of Southern Representatives in the 1980s and 1990s](#) (in Research Notes)" *Journal of Politics*, 65(1): 216-226.
- Stimson, James A. Michael B. Mackuen, Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "[Dynamic Representation.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*. Vol. 89 (pp. 543-565).
- Weissberg, Robert. 1978. "[Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 72:2 (pp. 535-547).

## Thursday, May 2

### LOBBYING

#### *Required Readings:*

- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, Peter M. Radcliffe, and Brandon L. Bartels. 2005. "[The Incidence and Timing of PAC Contributions to Incumbent U.S. House Members, 1993-94.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30(4): 549.
- Drutman, Lee. 2015. *The Business of America Is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate*. 1 edition. Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Chs. 1-4, 10.**
- Esterling, Kevin. 2007. "[Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees.](#)" *American Political Science Review* 101(1): 93.
- Fournaies, Alexander. 2018. "When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?" *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (1): 176–91. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12316>.
- Fournaies, Alexander, and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. "How Do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees?" *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (1): 132–47. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12323>.
- Hall, Richard L. and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "[Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.](#)" *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 69-84.
- Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1998. "[The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee.](#)" *Journal of Politics*, 61: 999-1024.
- Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1998. "[Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 92 (pp. 775-790).
- McCrain, Joshua. 2018. "Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of Congressional Staff Connections." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (4): 1369–83. <https://doi.org/10.1086/698931>.

#### *Recommended Readings:*

- Ainsworth, Scott and Itai Sened. 1993. "[The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 37:3 (pp. 834-866).
- Ainsworth, Scott H. 1997. "[The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 22 (pp. 517-534).
- Ainsworth, Scott. 1993. "[Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence.](#)" *The Journal of Politics*, 55:1 (pp. 41-56).

- Austen-Smith, David and John Wright. 1994. "[Counteractive Lobbying.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, (pp. 25-44).
- Austen-Smith, David. 1993. "[Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 37:3 (pp. 799-833).
- Denzau, Arthur T. and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "[Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests get Represented.](#)" *The American Political Science Review*, 80:1 (pp. 89-106).
- Evans, Diana. 1996. "[Before the Roll Call: Interest Group Lobbying and Public Policy Outcomes in House Committees.](#)" *Political Research Quarterly*, (pp. 287-304).
- Hall, Richard L. and Frank L. Wayman. 1990. "[Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees.](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 84: 797-820.
- Schnakenberg, Keith E. 2017. "Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (1): 129–45. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12249>.
- Wright, John R. 1985. "[PACS, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective.](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 79: 400-414.
- Wright, John R. 1990. "[Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S House of Representatives.](#)" *American Political Science Review*, 84:2 (pp. 417-438).
- Wright, John. 1996. *Interest Groups & Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence*. Allyn and Bacon.

**Thursday, May 9** In-class presentations of research projects. **Final paper DUE today.**

### VIII. Important Online Resources

#### CONGRESS

U.S. House	<a href="http://www.house.gov">http://www.house.gov</a>
U.S. Senate	<a href="http://www.senate.gov">http://www.senate.gov</a>
Library of Congress	<a href="http://www.loc.gov">http://www.loc.gov</a>
THOMAS- Legislative Information	<a href="http://congress.gov/">http://congress.gov/</a>
Federal Election Commission	<a href="http://www.fec.gov">http://www.fec.gov</a>
Federal Digital System (congressional hearings, Federal Register, Congressional Record, etc.)	<a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/">http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/</a>
CRS Reports	<a href="http://opencrs.com/">http://opencrs.com/</a>
Congressional Budget Office	<a href="http://www.cbo.gov/">http://www.cbo.gov/</a>

Congressional ProQuest (formerly Lexis-Nexis)	<a href="http://congressional.proquest.com/profiles/gis/search/basic/basicsearch">http://congressional.proquest.com/profiles/gis/search/basic/basicsearch</a>
Congressional Biographical Directory	<a href="http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp">http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp</a>
Legistorm	<a href="http://www.legistorm.com/index/about.html">http://www.legistorm.com/index/about.html</a>
Lobbying Disclosure MoneyLine	<a href="http://sopr.senate.gov/">http://sopr.senate.gov/</a> <a href="http://moneyline.cq.com/pml/home.do">http://moneyline.cq.com/pml/home.do</a>
Center for Responsive Politics	<a href="http://www.opensecrets.org/">http://www.opensecrets.org/</a>
The Redistricting Game	<a href="http://www.redistrictinggame.com/index.php">http://www.redistrictinggame.com/index.php</a>

## REFERENCE/RESEARCH

### H

APSA Citation Guide	<a href="http://www.wisc.edu/writing/Handbook/DocAPSA.html">http://www.wisc.edu/writing/Handbook/DocAPSA.html</a>
Vote View (Poole & Rosenthal scores)	<a href="http://www.voteview.com">http://www.voteview.com</a>
Congressional Bills Project	<a href="http://www.congressionalbills.org/">http://www.congressionalbills.org/</a>

### NEWS

CQ Weekly Report	<a href="http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/index.php">http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/index.php</a>
National Journal	<a href="http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/">http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/</a>
Roll Call	<a href="http://www.rollcall.com/">http://www.rollcall.com/</a>
Washington Post	<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/">http://www.washingtonpost.com/</a>
The Hill	<a href="http://www.thehill.com/">http://www.thehill.com/</a>
New York Times	<a href="http://www.nytimes.com">http://www.nytimes.com</a>
Politico	<a href="http://www.politico.com/">http://www.politico.com/</a>
C-SPAN	<a href="http://www.c-span.org/">http://www.c-span.org/</a>
NPR	<a href="http://www.npr.org/">http://www.npr.org/</a>