AMERICAN GOVERNMENT & POLITICS Government 510, Graduate Seminar George Mason University Thursdays 7:20pm – 10:00pm Robinson Hall A105 Spring 2015

updated January 16, 2015(b)

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Office Hours: Wednesdays 2:00-3:00pm & Thursdays 2:00pm - 3:00pm—and often just

before class 6:30-7:15, or by appointment

I. Course Description

This course provides an introduction to the classic and contemporary scientific literature on American politics and government. This course is designed for both Master's-level and Ph.D.-level students, with varying expectations for each. Master's students will get acquainted with the main findings in the various subfields of American politics and demonstrate their ability to read, criticize, and articulate the research in this field. I expect PhD students in this course are planning to teach and conduct original research in American politics. I expect that most students have already had some exposure to the literature in American politics, but I understand that there may be great variety in the depth of your exposure. In general, this course is designed to help graduate students become introduced to the breadth of this literature, to know the state-of-the-literature on a variety of topics (described below), and to help you transition from being primarily a consumer of the literature to a producer of the literature.

We will cover a variety of topics in the Political Science subfield of American politics. This course is designed to be a survey course, such that our introduction to each topic will be somewhat brief. Advanced courses are offered (or could be) on every topic we touch, so you can think of this class as being just the tip of the iceberg. For many of you, this type of introduction provides an excellent way to sample the types of questions, methodologies, and research being conducted in the subfields of American politics, and this may help you to choose your own course of research and area of specialty. Broadly, we will cover both institutions and behavior—the two major subfields in American politics. This means we will touch upon topics such as Congress, Bureaucracy, Presidency, and Courts. But we will also cover Public Opinion, Elections, Campaigns, Political Parties, Political Organizations, and perhaps some other specialized topics that the class chooses to cover as a group.

II. Course Goals

There are two primary goals for this course. First, students should gain a working familiarity with the literature in American Politics. One could not hope to understand the complete literature in only a semester, but this introduction will provide you with a foundation on which you can begin to build more specialized knowledge. Students planning to research and teach in American politics should gain a fundamental grasp of the substance of research in this vast field.

Students who do not expect to further study American politics will find the theoretical and methodological lessons are foundational to studying other subfields of political and social science. Second, students will practice and improve their critical thinking, writing, and research skills in this class. Students will have a heavy reading load, which is necessary to begin to dissect the voluminous literature in this field. Students will also actively engage with one another in research, presentations, and writing assignments.

III. Course Components

Course requirements are specific to students' degree programs.

Master's Degree Student Course Requirements

Class Presentation & Participation (15%) Each week, one (or two) student(s) will be responsible for presenting the required readings. The student presenter should circulate discussion questions to the rest of the class prior to the start of class (no later than Wednesday at 5:00pm). The presenter will provide a brief oral summary of the readings and help to start discussion about the day's topics. The presenter should note points of interest, confusion, or controversy in the readings and provide a thoughtful criticism.

Reading Summaries (25%) Each week each Master's student will submit a 1 page document that contains a brief summary of 3 of the week's required readings. Students may choose which readings to summarize. Each summary must include the following subheadings:

- Research Question state the main question the research seeks to answer
- *Theory* state the author's unique idea that potentially explains the phenomenon of question, or that answers the question of the research.
- *Hypotheses* restate the author's primary expectation.
- *Test* describe the means by which the author tests the main hypothesis. What method is used?
- *Results* describe the main finding of the test and the concluding inference the author draws to answer the research question.

Each of the 5 subheadings should be answered as succinctly as possible; in one sentence if possible. All three summaries should fit on one page. There are 11 class meetings, and each student must write 8 summary memos (meaning you get 3 optional bye-weeks, to be selected at your choosing).

Essays (60%) Each Master's student will write **four** essays (5-10 pages) on one of the "Key Questions" listed in each week's readings below. Students may choose a question on which to write. Students must use parenthetical citations with a complete bibliography at the end of the paper. Here is an example citation in this sentence (Victor 2015, 2). Or you might want to say that Victor argues for use of parenthetical citations, commonly called APSA- or Chicago-style (2015, 32). Resources for citation style are on Blackboard. Students must write an original essay that answers the question prompt, uses proper citations, and has excellent structure, grammar, and spelling. Essays should have a single thesis or argument and be well supported by relevant literature. Essays are due on: **February 19**, **March 19**, **April 9**, and **May 7**

PhD Student Course Requirements

Class Presentation & Participation (15%) Each week, one (or two) student(s) will be responsible for presenting the required readings. The student presenter should circulate discussion questions to the rest of the class prior to the start of class (no later than Wednesday at 5:00pm). The presenter will provide a brief oral summary of the readings and help to start discussion about the day's topics. The presenter should note points of interest, confusion, or controversy in the readings and provide a thoughtful criticism.

Weekly Reaction Papers (35%) Each week each PhD student must write a one page memo that provides a reaction to the week's readings. Students may choose to write about one, some, or all of the week's readings. The memos should not be thought of as summaries or book reports; rather, in addition to providing some summary, students should feel free to pose questions, raise criticisms, or explain how a piece fits into the broader literature. There are 11 class meetings, and each student must write 8 reaction memos (meaning you get 3 optional bye-weeks, to be selected at your choosing).

Research Design (50%) Each PhD student is responsible for writing one research design paper, approximately 12-18 pages in length. Think of this as a journal or conference quality research paper, without doing the actual research. Your paper must pose a unique and appropriate political science research question that is properly motivated, use the literature of the field to develop theoretical expectations about a relationship, and pose a suggested course of collecting and analyzing data that would allow a researcher to evaluate the question. In your conclusion you can speculate about findings, but you do not need to perform the research. These papers will be completed in three stages. First, you will complete a 1-page introduction that states a thesis, or research question, and provides a basic outline of your paper (10% of paper and paper grade) (due March 5). Second, you will write a literature review (60% of paper; 30% of grade) (due April 9). Third, you will hand in your completed project (100% of paper; 60% of grade) (due May 7). Late assignments will result in a reduced score.

IV. Logistics

Incompletes. I am not inclined to offer incomplete grades. I strongly advise you to organize yourself to complete the coursework in a timely fashion. I am open to helping you with your assignments, of course, and will do my best to help you develop projects of a reasonable scale. Students rarely start the semester planning to take an incomplete, but it is easy to get behind. Know that I will not be comfortable offering incomplete grades.

Cheating, Plagiarism, and Academic Integrity. Students in this course will be expected to comply with the George Mason University Honor Code (see http://honorcode.gmu.edu/). Any student engaged in any academic misconduct will receive an F on the offending exam or assignment. Egregious violations will result in an F grade for the course and will be reported to the appropriate Dean's office. These violations include cheating on an exam, using someone else's work as your own, and plagiarizing the written word. Plagiarism (using someone else's words or ideas without providing credit or citation) is a serious offense. If you have any questions at all about what constitutes cheating, plagiarism, or academic misconduct, please ask the instructor.

Students with Disabilities. If you have a disability for which you are or may be requesting an accommodation, please let me (the instructor) know and contact the Disability Resource Center (DRC) at (703) 993-2474. All discussions with me regarding disabilities are confidential.

Grading. In this course, I will use a grading scale that is typical of Ph.D.-level courses that includes a four-part scale. You can think of the scale as being: high-pass, pass, low-pass, or fail. The grade scale and its interpretation is the following:

Grade	Interpretation
A	Excellent work; high pass.
A-	Good work; pass.
B+	Work needs some improvement; low-pass. If you plan to take Ph.Dlevel exams in American politics, you need to do some additional review of the material presented in this course.
B or lower	Your work has not been adequate Ph.Dlevel work.

PhD students can think of their letter grades as a means of communicating their position in the degree program and as subtle advice about whether or not an academic career path is advisable. Master's students will also be graded on this scale, but the interpretation of letter grades is more about a reflection of the quality of the work, and less of a message to the student about career paths.

V. Required Texts

The reading load for this course is intense. We will read about a book a week, in addition to a handful of articles. It is vital that you keep up with the readings. One of the most important skills you will learn as a graduate student (most important in terms of being successful in graduate school) is how to efficiently digest a large volume of readings. I know that you will not be able to read every word that is assigned; but you will need to learn how to quickly glean the most important points from each reading. While I cannot require it, I *strongly* encourage you to take notes on everything you read. Good organization and careful note taking will increase your retention of the material, improve your ability to recall information, lead to superior classroom discussions, and reduce your research and study time at later points. Taking notes may mean it takes longer to get through some material, but the (long term) benefits of doing so, far exceed the (short term) costs. As a minor guide to digesting volumes of information in an efficient way, use the following questions to help focus your attention about each piece of research:

- 1.) What is the main question the author is asking?
- 2.) What motivates the question/why is the author asking the question?
- 3.) What is the primary expectation, hypothesis, or claim the author seeks to test?
- 4.) On what theory or logic is the expectation based?
- 5.) What methods of investigation has the author used to evaluate the claim?
- 6.) What are the primary findings? Were the expectations met?
- 7.) How does this research advance, or contribute to, our knowledge of this topic?

In addition to the following required texts, a series of articles (both required and recommended) are listed in the detailed weekly description below. I strongly recommend that students use bibliographic software to access, document, and catalog the items they read. While there are many such software options around, I recommend using Zotero, a free add-in for your webbrowser. It works with most browsers but is designed to work in Firefox and you'll get the most functionality from it if you use it with Firefox. Information and tutorials on Zotero are available here (http://infoguides.gmu.edu/politics/zotero). As a first assignment, I ask that students explore this software and use download all the readings into Zotero. You may notice that I have not provided links in the syllabus to the readings. All the readings are available through web access at Mason's library. I recommend using Jstor.org or Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com/) to find the articles listed below. You'll need to be logged into a secure Mason portal, either from a campus IP, or through a remote Mason VPN connection (https://sslvpn01.gmu.edu/danana/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi). From the library homepage you can search for Jstor, which will give you most of the articles, except those published in the last few years. For recent articles, first log into a Mason connection, then follow a google scholar link that takes you directly to the source journal. We will go over these strategies in class (note the visit from Dr. Helen McManus, Political Science librarian on February 5). Using bibliographic software will make your life easier—never fret about formatting a bibliography ever again! For graduate students who expect to take field exams, this approach is essential.

Required Books

- Bartels, Larry M. 2010. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. New York; Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A., and Douglas W. Rae. 2005. Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City, Second Edition. 2 edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. 1st edition. New York: Harper and Row.
- Howell, William G. 2003. *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection, Second Edition*. 2 edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Noel, Hans. 2014. *Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Olson, Mancur. 2009. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press.
- Rolfe, Dr Meredith. 2013. *Voter Turnout: A Social Theory of Political Participation*. Reprint edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1975. *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. 1 edition. Hinsdale, Ill: Cengage Learning.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions, 2nd Edition.* Second Edition edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Wilson, James. 1991. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.

VI. Course Schedule and Reading Assignments

Notes: - Books are highlighted in bold typeface.

- "Recommended Readings" are intended to help guide students' continued scholarship in the subfield and to provide additional suggested readings for students studying for PhD qualifying examinations.
- "Key questions" are broad questions addressed by the literature in the field. Students should have a sense of some answers to these questions after reading the assignments for each week and can provide guidance for class discussions and students' writing assignments.

Thursday, January 22

INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE

Key Questions:

- Is Political Science a "science?"
- What can the tools of science do to help us understand the political and social world?
- What is beyond the reach of understanding using social science tools?
- What are some key and burning questions that we should expect political science to help us understand in the future?

Required Readings:

Bond, Jon R. "The Scientification of the Study of Politics: Some Observations on the Behavioral Evolution in Political Science." *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 4 (2007): 897–907. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00597.x.

Noel, Hans. "Ten Things Political Scientists Know That You Don't." *The Forum* 8, no. 3 (January 14, 2010). doi:10.2202/1540-8884.1393.

Thursday, January 29

WHY GOVERNMENT?

Key Questions

- Describe the dominant theories and paradigms that explain the purpose of government.
- How relevant are Dahl's insights to the modern world?
- What are the basic properties and assumptions of the Downsian spatial model?

Required Readings:

Dahl, Robert. 1961. Who Governs? Yale University Press.

Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. 1st edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1957. (Chapters. 1-4)

The Federalist Papers, No. 10 & No. 51

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*, 2nd Ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Part I.

Thursday, February 5

*In Class Guest: Dr. Helen McManus (9:00pm)

REPRESENTATION

Key Questions:

- How does having a minority legislator affect the representation of minority constituents?
- What are some of the ways Americans have tried to increase the representation of minorities?
- Do Black and White legislators propose different kinds of legislation?
- What explains difference in legislative efficacy between male and female legislators?

- Do Blacks experience more political efficacy when represented by a Black? *Required Readings:*
 - Anzia, Sarah F., and Christopher R. Berry. "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?" *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 3 (2011): 478–93.
 - Broockman, David E. "Distorted Communication, Unequal Representation: Constituents Communicate Less to Representatives Not of Their Race." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 307–21. doi:10.1111/ajps.12068.
 - Griffin, John D., and Brian Newman. "The Unequal Representation of Latinos and Whites." *The Journal of Politics* 69, no. 4 (November 1, 2007): 1032–46.
 - Juenke, Eric Gonzalez, and Robert R. Preuhs. "Irreplaceable Legislators? Rethinking Minority Representatives in the New Century." *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 705–15.
 - Mansbridge, Jane. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes.'" *The Journal of Politics* 61, no. 3 (August 1, 1999): 628–57. doi:10.2307/2647821.
 - Merolla, Jennifer L., Abbylin H. Sellers, and Derek J. Fowler. "Descriptive Representation, Political Efficacy, and African Americans in the 2008 Presidential Election." *Political Psychology* 34, no. 6 (2013): 863–75. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00934.x.

- Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." *The Journal of Politics* 61, no. 3 (August 1, 1999): 658–79. doi:10.2307/2647822.
- Cannon, David. 1999. *Race and Representation in Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carson, Jamie L. Michael H. Crespin, Carrie P. Eaves, and Emily Wanless. 2011. "Constituency Congruency and Candidate Competition in U.S. House Elections." Legislative Studies Quarterly 36(3): 461-482.
- Cox, Gary and Jonathan Katz. 2002. Elbridge Gerry's Salamander. Cambridge UP.
- Erikson, Robert S. 1978. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A

 Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Representation Data." American Journal of Political
 Science 22:3 (pp. 511-535).
- Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. Mackuen, and James A. Stimson. 1998. "What Moves Macropartisanship? A Response to Green, Palmquist, and Schickler." The American Political Science Review 92:4.
- Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1977. "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration." *The American Political Science Review* 71:3 (pp. 883-917).
- Fenno, Richard. 1978. Homestyle. New York: Little Brown.
- Fowler, James. 2005. ""Dynamic Responsiveness in the U.S. Senate."." American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 29-312.
- Griffin, John D. and Brian Newman. 2005. "<u>Are Voters Better Represented</u>?" *Journal of Politics* 67(4): 1206-1227.
- Hill, Kim Quaile and Patricia A. Hurley. 1999. "<u>Dyadic Representation Reappraised</u>." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(1):109-137

Hutchings, Vincent L. Harwood K. McClerking and Guy-Uriel Charles. 2004.

"Congressional Representation of Black Interests: Recognizing the Importance of Stability." *The Journal of Politics* 66(2): 450-468.

Kanthak, Kristin and George A. Krause. 2010. "<u>Valuing Diversity in Political Organizations:</u> Gender and Token Minorities in the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(4): 839-854.

Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *The American Political Science Review* 57(1):45-56

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Concept of Representation.

Shotts, Kenneth W. 2003. "Racial Redistricting's Alleged Perverse Effects: Theory, Data, and 'Reality.' (in Research Notes)" *The Journal of Politics*, 65(1): 238-243.

Stimson, James A. Michael B. Mackuen, Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "<u>Dynamic Representation</u>." *The American Political Science Review* 89(3):543-565. 89: 543-565.

Thursday, February 12

IDEOLOGY

Key Questions:

- Can you define ideology?
- What are some ways we try to measure ideology? What are the costs and benefits of each?
- What is the relationship between ideology and party identification?

Required Readings:

Bonica, Adam. "Mapping the Ideological Marketplace." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 367–86. doi:10.1111/ajps.12062.

Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. 1st edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1957. (Chapters. 5-8)

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*, 2nd Ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., <u>Part II.</u>

Recommended Readings:

Alford, John R., Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing. 2005. "<u>Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted</u>?" *American Political Science Review* 99(2):153-167.

Fowler, James H. and Christopher T. Dawes. 2013. "In Defense of Genopolitics." *American Political Science Review*, 107, pp 362-374.

Thursday, February 19—NO CLASS TONIGHT

Friday, Feburary 20—Capital Hill Day
CAPITOL HILL DAY
9:00am – 1:00pm
2168 Rayburn House Office Building
Gold Room

Speakers TBA

Thursday, February 26

POLARIZATION

Key Questions:

- Is American having a culture war?
- Can both of the following be true: American political parties are highly polarized *and* there is little evidence of ideological polarization in the American electorate?
- What are the different ways of defining polarization?
- What are the different groups/categories of people in American politics that may be polarized?
- What are the differences in evidence and methodology that lead scholars in this subfield to reach different conclusion? Which approach(es) have a stronger inferential link to the conclusions drawn by the author(s)?

Required Readings:

- Abramowitz, Alan I., Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. "Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 75–88.
- Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." *The Journal of Politics* 60, no. 03 (August 1998): 634. doi:10.2307/2647642.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder. "Purple America." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (2006): 97–118.

Bartels, Larry M. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. New York; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

- Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. "How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 01 (February 2013): 57–79. doi:10.1017/S0003055412000500.
- Fiorina, Morris P., and Samuel J. Abrams. "Political Polarization in the American Public." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 563–88. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836.
- Jacoby, William G. "Is There a Culture War? Conflicting Value Structures in American Public Opinion." *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 04 (November 2014): 754–71. doi:10.1017/S0003055414000380.

- Enns, Peter K., Nathan J. Kelly, Jana Morgan, Thomas Volscho, and Christopher Witko. "Conditional Status Quo Bias and Top Income Shares: How U.S. Political Institutions Have Benefited the Rich." *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 02 (2014): 289–303. doi:10.1017/S0022381613001321.
- Jones, David R. 2010. "Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections." American Journal of Political Science 54(2): 323-337.
- Lazarus, Jeffrey. 2010. "Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2): 338-353.
- Lee, Frances. 2009. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U. S. Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
- Patty, John W. 2008. "<u>Equilibrium Party Government</u>." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(3): 636-655.

- Stoker, Laura and M. Kent Jennings. 2008. "Of Time and the Development of Partisan Polarization." American Journal of Political Science 52(3):619-635.
- Theriault, Sean. 2008. *Party Polarization in Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Thursday, March 5

POLITICAL PARTIES

Key Questions:

- Do parties help explain our ideological beliefs? Or do our ideological beliefs help explain our parties?
- Why do we have parties? Are they necessary? What benefits do they serve? What costs do they impose?
- How do citizens organize parties? How does the make-up of a party change over time? *Required Readings*
 - MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. "Macropartisanship." *The American Political Science Review* 83, no. 4 (December 1989): 1125. doi:10.2307/1961661.
 - Miller, Gary, and Norman Schofield. "Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 02 (2003): 245–60.
 - Noel, Hans. *Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
 - Schattschneider, Elmer E. *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. 1 edition. Hinsdale, Ill: Cengage Learning, 1975.
 - Woon, Jonathan, and Jeremy C. Pope. "Made in Congress? Testing the Electoral Implications of Party Ideological Brand Names." *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 3 (July 1, 2008): 823–36.

Recommended Readings:

Aldrich, John. 1995. Why Parties? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Binder, Sarah, Eric D. Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. "<u>Uncovering the Hidden</u> Effect of Party." *Journal of Politics* 61(3):815-831.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. "The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress." *The American Political Science Review* 95(3):673-687.

Thursday, March 12—No Class Tonight—SPRING BREAK

Thursday, March 19

CONGRESS

Key Questions:

- What motivates members of Congress?
- Are citizens too ignorant to be responsible voters?
- Why do members of Congress vote the way they do? What are the factors that contribute to legislative decision making?
- Are term limits a reasonable solution to what ails legislatures and representation?

Required Readings

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Philip Edward Jones. "Constituents' Responses to Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 3 (2010): 583–97.

- Carey, John M., Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell. "The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (May 1998): 271. doi:10.2307/440283.
- Kingdon, John W. "Models of Legislative Voting." *The Journal of Politics* 39, no. 03 (August 1977): 562. doi:10.2307/2129644.
- Lebo, Matthew J., Adam J. McGlynn, and Gregory Koger. "Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789-2000." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 464–81.
- Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection, Second Edition. 2 edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*, 2nd Ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Chs 11 & 12

- Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven: Yale U.P.
- Binder, Sarah A. 1996. "<u>The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990</u>." *The American Political Science Review* 90(1): 8-20
- Binder, Sarah A. and Steven S. Smith. 1997. *Politics or Principle: Filibustering in the United States Senate*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Clausen, Aage. 1973. How Congressmen Decide. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. (2007) [1993]. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fiorina, Morris. 1989. *Congress: Keystone to the Washington Establishment*. 2nd ed. New Have: Yale University Press.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R. Arthur Lupia, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2004. "When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement." *The Journal of Politics*, 66, pp 43-68.
- Kingdon, John W. 1989. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. 3rd ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Koger, Gregory. 2010. Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. University of Michigan Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lawrence Eric D., Forrest Maltzman and Steven S. Smith. 2006. "Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting." Lesigslative Studies Quarterly 31(1): 33-69.
- Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations. 1946-1990.
- Miller, Gary J. and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 1982. "<u>Universalism in Experimental Committees</u>." *The American Political Science Review* 76(3): 561-574
- Oleszek, Walter. 1996. *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Patty, John W. 2007. "<u>The House Discharge Procedure and Majoritarian Politics</u>" *Journal of Politics* 69(3): 678.

- Polsby, Nelson. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 62:144-168.
- Poole, Keith T. 1999. "NOMINATE: A Short Intellectual History." *The Political Methodologist* 9: 1-6.
- Redman, Eric. 1973. The Dance of Legislation. New York: Simon & Schuster Inc.
- Riker, William H. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." American Political Science Review 74(2): 432-446.
- Rohde, David. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. University of Chicago Press.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 1997. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress. C.Q. Press.
- Smith, Steven S. 1989. *Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate*. Washington: Brookings.

Thursday, March 26

PUBLIC OPINION AND VOTING

Key Questions:

- What are the consequences of Americans' relatively low voter turnout rates?
- How stable are individual political opinions?
- How stable are aggregate political opinions?
- Do people have consistent political attitudes or are they affected by campaigns, messaging, elites, etc.?
- If people always have the same attitudes, why all the fuss over campaigns? If people are susceptible to messaging, then is democracy in peril, existing only at the whims of the latest fads and loudest screamers?

Required Readings

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- Zaller, John. "Information, Values, and Opinion." *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 4 (December 1, 1991): 1215–37. doi:10.2307/1963943.

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Lupia, Arthur and Jesse O. Menning. 2009. "When Can Politicians Scare Citizens into Supporting Bad Policies?" American Journal of Political Science 53(1): 90-106.
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Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thursday, April 2

ELECTIONS & VOTING

Key Questions:

- Why are incumbents so advantaged?
- What are the sources of incumbency advantages? What are its consequences?
- Why do people vote?
- What theoretical paradigm best explains a citizens decision to vote (or not)?
- What reforms can governments make that will increase voter turnout?

Required Readings:

- Burden, Barry C., David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer, and Donald P. Moynihan. "Election Laws, Mobilization, and Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 1 (2014): 95–109. doi:10.1111/ajps.12063.
- Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts. "Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 02 (2007): 289–301.

Downs, Anthony. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. 1st edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1957 (Chapters. 11-14)

- Friedman, John N., and Richard T. Holden. "The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: What's Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?*." *The Journal of Politics* 71, no. 02 (April 2009): 593. doi:10.1017/S0022381609090483.
- Nickerson, David W. "Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments." *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 01 (February 2008). doi:10.1017/S0003055408080039.

Rolfe, Dr Meredith. *Voter Turnout: A Social Theory of Political Participation*. Reprint edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

- Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr. and Charles Stewart III. 2001. "<u>Candidate positioning in U.S. House elections</u>," *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1):136-159.
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- Erikson, Robert and Thomas Palfrey. 2000. "<u>Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games:</u> Theory and Data." *The American Political Science Review* 94(3): 595-609.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale UP

- Gerber, Alan. 1998. "<u>Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election</u>

 <u>Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables</u>." *The American Political Science Review* 92(2): 401-411.
- Huddy, Leonie and N. Terkildsen. 1993. "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(1):119-147.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1987. "<u>The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1952-1982</u>." *American Journal of Political Science* 31(1):126-141.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 2004 The Politics of Congressional Elections. 6th ed. Longman Press.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments." American Journal of Political Science 34(2): 334-362.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986." American Political Science Review 83(3): 773-793.
- Stein, Robert M. and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1996. "<u>The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel</u>." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(4): 1300-1326.

Thursday, April 9

THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

Key Questions:

- What are the three primary, competing models of legislative decision making?
- From what source does our justice system earn its legitimacy?
- Why don't we see more judicial nominees rejected by the Senate?
- What determines whether the Supreme Court will hear a case?
- Are judges and justices truly objective? Is justice blind to bias? Can it be?

Required Readings:

- Bartels, Brandon L. "The Constraining Capacity of Legal Doctrine on the U.S. Supreme Court." *The American Political Science Review* 103, no. 3 (August 1, 2009): 474–95.
- Moraski, Bryon J., and Charles R. Shipan. "The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices." *American Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 4 (October 1999): 1069. doi:10.2307/2991818.
- Nicholson, Stephen P., and Thomas G. Hansford. "Partisans in Robes: Party Cues and Public Acceptance of Supreme Court Decisions." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 3 (July 1, 2014): 620–36. doi:10.1111/ajps.12091.
- Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. "The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices." *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 4 (November 1996): 971. doi:10.2307/2111738.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*, 2nd Ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., <u>Ch. 15</u>

- Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 1998. *The Choices Justices Make*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Knight, Jack and Lee Epstein. 1996. "The Norm of Stare Decisis." *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 1018-1035.
- Murphy, Walter F. 1964. *Elements of Judicial Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Rosenberg, Gerald. 1993. *The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. *The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited*. Cambridge University Press.
- Segal, Jeffrey and Harold Spaeth. 1996. "Norms, Dragons, and Stare Decisis: A Response. *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 1064-1082.

Thursday, April 16—NO CLASS (Midwest Political Science Association Meetings in Chicago)

Thursday, April 23

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH & THE BUREAUCRACY

Key Questions:

- What makes the presidency powerful?
- When are presidents influenced by public whims?
- When and why does congress engage in bureaucratic oversight?
- When and why do presidents take unilateral action?

Required Readings:

- Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth W. Shotts. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (October 2004): 690–706. doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00096.x.
- McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 1 (February 1984): 165. doi:10.2307/2110792.
- Howell, William G. 2003. Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*, 2nd Ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Chs 13 & 14
- Wilson, James Q. (2000) [1989]. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.

- Bawn, Kathleen. 1995. "Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures." American Political Science Review 89: 62-73.
- Cameron, Charles and Nolan McCarty. 2004. "Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7: 409-35.
- Cameron, Charles M. 2000. *Veto Bargaining and the Politics of Negative Power*. Cambridge University Press.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. "The president's legislative influence from public appeals," *American Journal of Political Science* 45 : 313-329.
- Carpenter, Daniel P. 1996. "Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation." American Political Science Review 90(2): 283-302.
- Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, pp.1-64.
- Groseclose, Timothy, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "<u>The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience</u>." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:100-119.

- Kernell, Samuel. 1986. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership.* Washington: CO Press.
- Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation*. The University of Chicago Press.
- McCarty, Nolan. 2000. "Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94(1): 117-129.
- Miller, Gary. 1992. *Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Moe, Terry M. and Wiliam G. Howell. 1999. "Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29(4): 850-873.
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- Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*. Simon and Schuster.
- Ragsdale, Lyn and John J. Theis, III. 1997. "<u>The Institutionalization of the American Presidency</u>." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:1280-1318.
- Shipan, Charles. 2004. "Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Political Influence." *American Political Science Review* 98(3):467-480.
- Stephen Skowronek. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Thursday, April 30

LOBBYING AND GROUPS

Key Questions:

- Can campaign contributors "buy" favored legislation?
- What are the positive and negative roles that lobbyists and organized interests play in the policy making process?
- Why do people organize into groups? Is it inevitable? Unnatural?
- Do legislators *need* lobbyists?

Required Readings:

- Carpenter, Daniel P., Kevin M. Esterling, and David M. J. Lazer. "Friends, Brokers, and Transitivity: Who Informs Whom in Washington Politics?" *The Journal of Politics* 66, no. 1 (February 1, 2004): 224–46. doi:10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00149.x.
- Esterling, Kevin M. "Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees." *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 01 (2007): 93–109.
- Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardorff. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." American Political Science Review 100, no. 01 (2006): 69–84.
- Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." *The American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 797. doi:10.2307/1962767.
- Olson, Mancur. (1971) [1965]. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*, 2nd Ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Part III.

Recommended Readings:

- Ainsworth, Scott and Itai Sened. 1993. "The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences." *The American Journal of Political Science* 37(3):834-866.
- Ainsworth, Scott H. 1997. "The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22(4):517-533.
- Austen-Smith, David. 1993. "Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes." *The American Journal of Political Science* 37(3):799-833.
- Bachrach, Peter and Morton Baratz. 1961. "Two Faces of Power." *The American Political Science Review* 56(4):947-52.
- Baumgartner, Frank R. and Beth L. Leech. 1998. *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science*. Princeton University Press.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, Peter M. Radcliffe, and Brandon L. Bartels. 2005. "<u>The Incidence and Timing of PAC Contributions to Incumbent U.S. House Members</u>, 1993-94." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30(4): 549.
- Denzau, Arthur T. and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "<u>Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests get Represented</u>." *The American Political Science Review* 80(1):89-106.
- Evans, Diana. 1996. "Before the Roll Call: Interest Group Lobbying and Public Policy Outcomes in House Committees." Political Research Quarterly 49(2):287-304.
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- Hansen, John Mark. 1991. *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1999. "The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee." *Journal of Politics* 61(4): 999-1024.
- Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1998. "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress." *The American Political Science Review* 92(4):775-790.
- Kollman, Ken. 1998. *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies*. Princeton University Press.
- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Knopf.
- Wright, John R. 1985. "PACS, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective," *The American Political Science Review* 79(2):400-414.
- Wright, John R. 1990. "<u>Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S House of Representatives</u>." *The American Political Science Review* 84(2):417-438. :
- Wright, John. 1996. *Interest Groups & Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence*. Allyn and Bacon.

Thursday, May 7
FINAL CLASS
STUDENT PRESENTATIONS OF FINAL PAPERS

VIII. Important Online Resources

CONGRESS

U.S. House

http://www.house.gov

U.S. Senate http://www.senate.gov
Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov
THOMAS- Legislative Information http://thomas.loc.gov
Federal Election Commission http://www.fec.gov

Federal Digital System (congressional http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

hearings, Federal Register, Congressional Record, etc.)

CRS Reports http://opencrs.com/
Congressional Budget Office http://www.cbo.gov/

Congressional Universe (Lexis-Nexis) http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp

Congressional Biographical Directory http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp

Legistorm http://www.legistorm.com/index/about.html

Lobbying Disclosure http://sopr.senate.gov/

MoneyLine http://moneyline.cq.com/pml/home.do

Center for Responsive Politics http://www.opensecrets.org/

The Redistricting Game http://www.redistrictinggame.com/index.php

REFERENCE/RESEARCH

Mason Library PoliSci Page http://infoguides.gmu.edu/politics

APSA Citation Guide http://www.wisc.edu/writing/Handbook/DocAPSA.html

Vote View (Poole & Rosenthal http://www.voteview.com

scores)

Congressional Bills Project http://www.congressionalbills.org/

NEWS

CQ Weekly Report http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/index.php
CongressDaily AM/PM http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/

Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/

The Hill http://www.thehill.com/
New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/
Los Angeles Times http://www.latimes.com/
C-SPAN http://www.npr.org/
NPR http://www.npr.org/